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Recommendations
\ Deradicalization as a means of terror 
prevention requires cooperation be-
tween Russia and the United Nations
The strategic forced relocation of radical fighters by the 
regime alliances to areas controlled by the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA), for instance, leads to local populations being 
terrorized. Growing poverty and financial incentives 
draw fighters towards extremist groups. Expertise by 
Russia and the United Nations must be combined to 
develop and implement de-radicalization programmes 
if further escalation of terror is to be stopped locally and 
globally.
\ Donors should continue and coordi-
nate support for the moderate Syrian 
opposition on the diplomatic level 
The moderate civil-political opposition, e. g. Higher 
Negotiation Committee should be a key actor to shape 
political reform in the Grand Bargain and to create an 
internationally acceptable democratic and inclusive 
framework. Donors should, therefore, continue the 
financial and ideational support of the opposition. This 
support, however, ought to be coordinated and allow for 
self-determined prioritisation of needs (e.g. legal advice, 
negotiation training).
\ NATO member states should force  
Turkey to withdraw from northern Syria 
NATO member states should expel Turkey from 
membership unless, it withdraws its troops from Syria. 
To secure the northern border, the UN could offer the 
immediate deployment of troops to Afrin, which could 
be extended to a Grand Bargain for other opposition-
controlled areas. This deal would have to include Russia. 
\ Grand Bargain: Develop a Joint Mech-
anism for the deployment of UN blue 
helmets and negotiations with Russia 
for a political solution to the war 
Provided that major alliances among the armed opposition 
consent, shared responsibility for protection by the 
UN and Russia provides an opportunity for ceasefires, 
the deployment of UN blue helmets, a reformed state 
system without Assad and deradicalization programmes. 
It could be achieved through a Grand Bargain.
\ If Russia were to act as a mediator, it 
must stop current systematic attacks 
on civilians immediately 
If Russia is to change its role from an aggressor to 
that of a mediator, the attacks in eastern Ghouta, 
Idlib, Hama countryside and elsewhere must stop 
with immediate effect.  
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War trends: International security  
interests are prioritized 
In the Syrian war, which began in 2011 with protest 
for democratic participation and against the auto-
cratic regime, original grievances continued to be 
sidelined over the past year. The media focused on the 
fight against Daesh (the Islamic State, IS), which in 
Syria is being carried out by the US-led international 
coalition as well as the regime alliance (Syria, Russia, 
Iran, and Hezbollah). An estimated several hundred 
opposition groups, which are highly heterogeneous, 
continued to face the challenge of having to fight on 
two fronts against the regime and Daesh. With the 
exception of the US, member states of the interna-
tional alliance have not been willing to deploy troops 
on the ground. Instead, they expected Syrian opposi-
tion groups to withdraw their troops fighting against 
the regime alliance to fight Daesh, yet without offer-
ing them support for their cause in return. In the 
fight against Daesh, international security interests 
are being prioritized, while local populations remain 
exposed to attacks without protection, and original 
grievances continue to be ignored. 
Failing de-escalation zones and forced 
relocation
The impression that fighting decreased over the past 
year is a misconception that results from a lack of 
media attention and data. In February 2018, the United 
Nations warned that the war has become extreme—
worse than Kosovo ever was (Barnard, 2018). Progress 
allegedly made with the introduction of de-escalation 
zones was largely on paper only and diverted atten-
tion from escalating violence elsewhere. Even the 
de-escalation zones are now being attacked continu-
ally as is the case with. eastern Ghouta, causing the 
deaths of scores of civilians on a daily basis. Standard 
measures of conflict do not exist. Given that casual-
ties have not been counted since 2014 and hospitals 
are targeted, only partially functional, understaffed 
and out of reach in many locations, no figures on  
direct or indirect victims of war are available. The 
Syrian regime continues to refuse permission for UN 
observers, and travel bans and a lack of security con-
tinue to impede independent journalism. The war is 
rendered almost invisible.
Weekly analyses of fighting, limited media reports 
and data on the humanitarian situation, however, 
show a different trend. The de-escalation zones, 
which allegedly contributed to appeasement, remained 
without effect. In the course of the Astana-negotia-
tions initiated by Russia from May 2017 onwards, 
Russia, Iran and Turkey declared their intention of 
implementing four de-escalation zones in Syria with 
various guaranteeing powers. Their stated goals were 
to reduce fighting, ensure access to humanitarian aid 
and to isolate fighters of Daesh and Hayat Tahrir 
al-Sham (HTS, formerly the Nusra Front)—both cate-
gorized as terrorist organizations—from other armed 
groups in order to fight these networks. De-escalation 
zones were announced for parts of the governorates 
of Daraa and Qunaytra (July 2017), eastern Ghouta in 
rural Damascus (July), northern rural parts of the 
governorate of Homs (August) and Idlib as well as 
parts of Lattakia, Hama and Aleppo (September). 
These have only been implemented partially. Eastern 
Ghouta is still in its third year under siege and, like 
Idlib, has been subjected to heavy aerial bombard-
ment by the regime alliance since the beginning of 
the year. De-confliction zones were introduced e.g. for 
Afrin in the governorate of Aleppo—now seeing the 
invasion of Turkish troops facing Syrian Armed Forces—
and eastern Qalamoun in rural Damascus. These 
zones served to avoid direct clashes between the 
United States and Russia. Nonetheless, they could not 
prevent the most recent Russian casualties caused by 
US attacks in Deir al-Zur (Feb. 2018). Especially the 
offensive launched by the regime alliance in Idlib—
alleged de-escalation zone—since late last year, the 
Turkish invasion in northern Syria, and current aerial 
attacks on eastern Ghouta show a new climax in the 
escalation of violence which had built up over the 
past year. 
The overall humanitarian situation has deteriorated 
further. Even after attempts of implementing de- 
escalation zones, UN access to people in need, of 
UN peacekeeping mission and deal with Russia  
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whom 13.5 million depend on humanitarian aid, re-
mains severely restricted. Only about five per cent of 
targeted recipients were reached in hard-to-reach 
areas. In areas under siege, access decreased from 13 
to six per cent. Among 6.3 million internally displaced 
persons, 1.8 million were newly displaced in 2017 
(2016: 2.0 million). This is a further indication of the 
fact that levels of violence have hardly changed. In 
addition to people fleeing from fighting, the number 
of people who became victims of organized and sys-
tematic displacement increased drastically. The regime 
alliance forcefully relocated about 33,000 people alone 
from al-Wa’er and through the so-called Four Town 
Agreement (Fu’ah, Kefrayya, Zabadani und Madayya).
The United Nations is no party to these relocations, 
officially considered evacuations, “which do not  
appear to meet international legal standards or adhere 
to humanitarian principles (UNSC, 2017). Given the 
blockade of the Security Council by Russia and China, 
however, this critique is without consequences. The 
international community remains helplessly paralyzed 
in spite of relentless aerial and ground attacks on  
civilian targets such as residential areas, hospitals, 
schools and basic infrastructure by the regime alliance; 
the sarin gas attack on Khan Shaykhoun, proven to 
have been launched by the regime and other chemi-
cal attacks, recently also with napalm; satellite im-
agery on mass executions in Sednayya prison and 
forced disappearances of an estimated 85,000 men, 
women and children. Although war crimes have also 
been proven for other belligerents, the majority of 
cases have been committed by the regime alliance.1
Consequently, de-escalation and de-confliction zones 
have not improved the situation of civilians at large. 
Instead, they allowed for the regime alliance to shift 
troops to strategically relevant fronts. Despite their 
 
1 \  For example, 90 per cent of sieges are still being carried out by pro- 
regime forces. These are estimated to be responsible for the same share 
of cases of enforced disappearances. Cf. e.g. Syrian Network for Human 
Rights (2017).
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period, the moderate opposition was further margin-
alized by the suspension of the CIA train-and-equip 
programme, which had supported the FSA with sala-
ries, training and equipment.2 In southern Syria, 
moderate groups have been victims of targeted at-
tacks. These include assassinations of prominent civil 
and military personalities by the regime alliance, 
Daesh and HTS. Furthermore, moderate groups now 
also dispose of even fewer resources that would help 
prevent the defection of fighters to extremist groups. 
Given an acute poverty rate of 69 per cent, people also 
defect because of the sheer necessity of securing in-
come. In some of its affiliate groups, the FSA is con-
fronted with growing radicalization. After the United 
States conditioned further support to the FSA with 
the demand for a unified alliance of fighters in north-
ern Syria, the Syrian interim government of the oppo-
sition announced in September that it formed a Syri-
an National Army. The latter is estimated to include 
about 22,000 fighters (Dec. 2017).
The regime’s Syrian Armed Forces have been severely 
weakened. They are dependent on the Russian Air 
force and ground troops by Hezbollah and Iranian-led 
Afghan and Iraqi militias. Nonetheless, the regime 
alliance benefitted from the US-led intervention 
against Daesh, which allowed the regime alliance to 
focus on its battle against the opposition. The latter 
was in turn weakened by having to dispatch ground 
troops for the fight against Daesh. Due to a border 
agreement between Jordan, Russia and the United 
States (July 2017), Iran and Hezbollah were seemingly 
forced to withdraw fighters from a 55km corridor 
along the southern border. However, they retained 
their presence through affiliated militias. On the 
northern and eastern borders, Turkey had vehement-
ly opposed collaboration between the United States 
and the SDF because the latter includes the People’s 
Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey considers to be 
a terrorist group due to its links with the Turkish 
PKK. Turkey suggested to the United States two alter-
native plans for recapturing Raqqa without SDF in-
volvement, which the United States rejected. In 
2 \  At the time, the United States and Western donors understood „moder-
ate“ groups to be secular groups. A published study on current catego-
risations is yet to be made available. Cf. Small Arms Survey (2016).
disagreement on the future of the country, the regime 
alliance and the US-led international alliance against 
Daesh (including NATO) seemingly share the goal of 
defeating Daesh. However, recapturing territory from 
Daesh has also been a race for expanding control be-
tween the regime alliance and opposition groups, and 
the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in particular.
Increasing radicalization 
The conquest of Mosul in Iraq (July 2017), of the cities 
of Raqqa (by the Kurdish-dominated SDF, Oct.) and 
Deir al-Zur (by pro-regime forces, Nov.) and the sur-
rounding areas are signs of Daesh’s defeat. In total, 
25,000-60,000 fighters were killed. Yet, various agree-
ments on safe conduct for IS fighters and their fami-
lies show that belligerents have no demobilization 
programmes for Islamist extremists in place, who are 
either killed or knowingly left in the region. More 
than in the case of Daesh, this concerns fighters of 
HTS, which is a former al-Qaida affiliate. In 2017 
alone, the regime alliance forcefully relocated several 
thousand HTS fighters and their families to Idlib. This 
strategy exposes local civilians to forced recruitment 
and a daily life characterized by radicalism. Despite 
persistent reports on human trafficking, slavery and 
forced marriages among IS and HTS fighters, their 
“families” are being forcefully relocated along with 
them without any checks. 
The regime alliance is thus catalyzing radicalization 
by provoking a high presence of extremist groups in 
Idlib as an FSA stronghold, but also in other opposi-
tion-held parts of the country. This leads to clashes 
with other Salafist–jihadist groups, but also with the 
moderate opposition, which is weakened as a result. 
HTS now dominates Idlib also by having taken over 
its elected city council, which had been running 
Idlib’s civil administration since August 2017, by force. 
The regime alliance thus consciously incites fighting 
within opposition-held areas. Months ago, it thus 
started creating a pretext for the present major offen-
sive as a “fight against terror”, which had been 
mounted with aerial bombardment and ground at-
tacks on Idlib since February 2018. In that same 
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dominance extending to the diplomatic level has  
further divided the opposition. It is not feasible for all 
groups to attend both strands of negotiations due to 
limited time and resources. Furthermore, both pro-
cesses pursue different goals, which has also prompted 
boycott. Astana sought to draw armed actors away 
from Geneva, which served to side-line the civil– 
political opposition and the United Nations. Sochi’s 
new committee on constitutional reform, which 
competes with the Geneva talks, leads to further 
marginalization. 
International donors, including the German Foreign 
Office and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, spent years supporting the political 
opposition in democracy-oriented self-organization, 
training and legal advice. If a future peace agreement 
were to have legitimacy also for opposition-held areas, 
the support for civil–political groups on the ground 
and in exile must be continued. Competing donor in-
terests, as can be observed presently, must instead be 
coordinated. Civil–political groups must be able to de-
termine their activities so that they can develop po-
litical programmes that are in line with local needs 
and that can make a substantial contribution to 
shaping the country’s future. 
Urgency and feasibility of interventions 
by NATO and the United Nations
Present attacks by the regime alliance on Idlib and 
eastern Ghouta and the Turkish invasion in the north 
have escalated the war further. While the regime alli-
ance continues to carry out targeted attacks on civil-
ians and civilian infrastructure, NATO member states 
should take a clear position for the protection of civil-
ians and to prevent a further rise in radicalization 
that represents a global threat. Humanitarian aid is 
essential, but it does not protect civilians against sys-
tematic attack and death. The Turkish invasion has 
created a situation that requires action. It also opens 
a window of opportunity for a multilateral Grand Bar-
gain, which could be negotiated in four partially par-
allel steps. 
January 2018, the United Sates stated its intention to 
deploy 30,000 fighters along the Turkish border jointly 
with the SDF (Wintour, 2018). This provoked the 
Turkish invasion in northern Syria, which aims to 
“annihilate” YPG fighters.  
Overall, opposition groups still control about one-
third of Syrian territory. This evaluation of key trends 
since 2017 shows that the implementation of de-esca-
lation zones and reconstruction deals, also contem-
plated by the European Union, by the regime alliance 
are premature. On the contrary, violence is escalating. 
Short-lived media attention on Afrin reveals that in-
ner-Syrian developments now only capture interna-
tional attention if, as in the case with Turkey being a 
NATO member state and partner of the “refugee deal”, 
these concern major Western interests. 
Peace negotiations are at risk due to 
marginalization of the opposition
On the diplomatic level, the Syrian opposition is at 
risk of losing relevance. This development endangers 
the creation of a strong vision for a future Syria sup-
porters of the opposition could also identify with, and 
which would thus be crucial to ending conflict and 
restoring peace. After decades of oppression within 
Syria, a varied political opposition has emerged in ex-
ile over the past years, often with external support. 
Various groups and umbrella organizations, such as 
the Higher Negotiations Committee and its sub-
groups, have organized themselves and are working 
towards political programmes for a future Syria. Oth-
ers, such as the Damascus Declaration affiliates, were 
founded in Syria long before the war. Also, new local 
political opposition groups emerged throughout the 
war and in many areas still seek to persist. 
The UN-led Geneva negotiations aim for a political 
solution of the conflict with the participation of some 
of these groups, but these negotiations have been 
weakened when Russia, Iran and Turkey introduced 
parallel negotiations in Astana in spring 2017. These 
primarily targeted armed actors while intending to 
negotiate ceasefires for de-escalation zones. Russian 
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enforceable guarantees, a self-determined, participa-
tory and transparent set-up of the new state system, 
the abdication of Assad, and jointly agreed and imple-
mented security sector reform and the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of fighters. 
Fourth, this approach would require Russia’s agree-
ment. Although Russia has supported Assad’s presi-
dency thus far, the present situation shows that an 
end to the war may be unattainable for decades to 
come, while the numbers of Russian casualties are 
rising and the risk of terror attacks in Russia is grow-
ing, as the IS attack in Dagestan of February 2018 
shows. The past seven years have shown that this war 
cannot be won militarily, and neither can it defeat 
terrorism, as the failure of de-escalation zones, re-
newed violence and increasing radicalization show. 
Russia and the regime alliance do not possess the  
capacities to secure territorial gains in the long-term, 
or to implement deradicalization and demobilization 
programmes that are necessary to halt and reverse 
the current trend towards Islamist radicalization. The 
deaths of more than 200 Russian mercenaries since 
the beginning of 2018 show that the war is increas-
ingly claiming Russian lives. Force alone will not  
allow for sustainable peace in the middle of a highly 
volatile region, let alone the return of refugees who 
had fled war and political persecution. To allow  
return, original grievances rooted in the country’s 
dictatorship need to be resolved, and a political solu-
tion must be found. Russia would be made responsible 
for protection in regime-controlled areas, and its  
approval is needed for blue helmet deployment for 
opposition-held areas, but the latter would have to  
exclude Russian soldiers. 
The suggested combination of Turkish withdrawal 
and the deployment of blue helmets also serves Turk-
ish interests if it assures further NATO membership, 
secures Afrin, avoids clashes with the regime alliance 
and ensures that the Kurds remain part of the Syrian 
state instead of pursuing further autonomy. Their de-
clared intent to become part of a federal Syrian state 
might help this approach. 
First, NATO should make Turkey’s continued member-
ship in the alliance conditional on internal reforms 
and the withdrawal of troops from northern Syria. 
This is necessary to prevent further escalation of vio-
lence with which Turkey targets YPG, PKK and affili-
ated fighters, which are estimated at 60,000 in Syria 
alone.3 Although the SDF provided large numbers of 
troops for ground battles for the international alli-
ance against Daesh led by the United States, the latter 
do not seem to withstand Turkish pressure and ap-
pear unwilling to defend the SDF. Fighting between 
Turkish and SDF troops risks high numbers of casual-
ties. The conflict also risks extending to the Kurds in 
Iraq, a country that is already highly unstable. Al-
though Russia has so far tolerated Turkey’s presence, 
the regime alliance have moved ground troops to the 
north. The question whether conflict will also esca-
late between Turkey and the regime alliance in the 
north will also depend on how currently rising ten-
sions between Hezbollah in the country and Israel 
develop in the south. To prevent further escalation, it 
is imperative that Turkey withdraw. 
Second, the United Nations could offer the deploy-
ment of blue helmets to Afrin to protect civilians and 
end hostilities. This would allow to separate forces. It 
would respond to Turkey’s perceived need to secure 
Afrin and stop further clashes between Turkey, the 
SDF and the regime alliance. Furthermore, it would 
normalize multilateral UN involvement and if suc-
cessful can be extended to other areas. 
Third, the offer of expanded blue helmet deployment 
could serve as an entry point for an end to the war 
that could be negotiated politically. This requires, pri-
marily, the consent of large alliances of armed oppo-
sition groups, such as the FSA and SDF. Given the 
scale of atrocities committed by the regime alliance, 
their agreement is uncertain. However, it is in their 
interest to prevent further loss of territory and at-
tacks on civilians by the regime alliance provided 
that they are granted their central demand, i.e. politi-
cal participation. If hopes for such an agreement are 
meant to be realistic, these will necessitate 
3 \  Reliable figures are not available. Cf. Perry (2016).
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de-escalation of current tensions and joint action to 
prevent a further expansion of global terror. Germany, 
NATO and the United Nations could re-establish their 
credibility in the region by offering not words, but ac-
tion to protect civilians from genocide and politicide 
and to protect human rights. This, too, is essential for 
a long-term strategy of terror prevention. Finally, for 
Syria, there might be a chance of an end to the war.
The United Nations and Russia would thus have to 
jointly act as guarantors for state reform, deradicali-
zation and demobilization. If Russia was to be won for 
this, the Security Council blockade would be resolved 
to pave the way for a UN mandate. Russia would have 
to be willing to end its alliance with the current re-
gime, which would have to be replaced by a mixed 
transition government. This joint responsibility 
would require detailed mechanisms and division of 
labour in overseeing these processes in different parts 
of the country. This approach has never been imple-
mented before and necessitates comprehensive con-
sultations with expert commissions  to develop the 
exact mandate, set-up and sanction mechanisms for 
such an agreement in close collaboration with local 
military and civil–political groups, such as those rep-
resented in the peace negotiations, on all sides. 
Such an approach holds significant risks. It must be 
expected that current tensions among NATO member 
states, the United States and Russia would seriously 
impede trust building. For Russia and UN member 
states, there is the danger that either party may break 
agreements and potentially expose blue helmets and 
Russian security forces to attack. Also, experience in 
developing deradicalization programmes is still lim-
ited (Nigeria, Somalia). This makes the likelihood of 
their success difficult to gauge. Extremist groups are 
likely to refuse participation in such a deal and will 
try to undermine it with further attacks. It is further 
unclear how foreign Shiite militias and Iran would 
respond. However, these are effectively dependent on 
the Russian Air force, and with that on their presence 
being tolerated by Russia. 
At the same time, non-intervention by the United  
Nations equally carries great risks of a further escala-
tion of the war in the region especially with the in-
volvement of Turkey, Iraq, Iran/Hezbollah and Israel. 
In contrast, an agreement between Syrian fighting 
parties, Russia and the United Nations would repre-
sent the opportunity for a multilateral peace agree-
ment and the protection of local civilians. NATO, the 
United Nations and Russia would benefit from the 
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